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Abstract - We extend and complete recent work concerning the analytic solution
of the minority game. Nash equilibria (NE) of the game have been found to be re-
lated to the ground states of a disordered hamiltonian with replica symmetry breaking
(RSB), signalling the presence of a large number of them. Here we study the num-
ber of NE both analytically and numerically. We then analyze the stability of the
recently-obtained replica-symmetric solution and, in the region where it becomes un-
stable, derive the solution within one-step RSB approximation. We are finally able to
draw a detailed phase diagram of the model.
1 Introduction
The minority game has drawn much attention recently as a toy model of a
market [1, 2, 3]. In the simplest possible case, when no public information [4]
is present, its definition is fairly simple. At each time step, N players have to
choose between two actions, such as buying a certain stock or selling it. Those
who end up in the minority side win. This mechanism can be obtained by
abstracting the well known law of supply-and-demand. When the majority of
traders is buying a certain asset it is convenient to be a seller, for prices are
likely to be high, and viceversa. The minority side has an advantage.
The full complexity of the model arises in the presence of public informa-
tion, which is modeled by the occurrence of one of P events representing, e.g.,
some political news or a price change. In the minority game agents resort to
choice rules or information-processing devices – called strategies henceforth –
which suggest them whether to “buy” or “sell” given the information they have
received. Then each player acts according to the suggestion of his best perform-
ing strategy. This mechanism allows to tackle the central problem one faces
when trying to understand the collective behaviour of systems of heterogeneous
agents interacting under strategic interdependence (as in markets), that is, how
agents react to public information (e.g., political news or price changes) and the
feedback effects that these reactions have on public information.
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Early numerical simulations [2, 5, 6, 7] have shown a remarkably rich be-
haviour where both cooperativity and crowd effects [7, 8] arise. Much emphasis
was initially put on the emergence of a cooperative phase in the stationary state
as compared to the reference situation of random agents – i.e., agents who toss
a coin to decide which action to take. Agents in the minority game are able
to coordinate their actions and reduce the global waste of resources below the
level corresponding to random agents.
Later work [9, 10, 11, 12] has revealed that the agents’ adaptive dynam-
ics minimizes a global function, related to market predictability, and that the
system undergoes a phase transition between an asymmetric and a symmetric,
unpredictable market, as the ratio α = P/N decreases. A full characterization
of the model’s behaviour for N → ∞ was derived studying the minima of the
global function by the replica method [10, 11, 12]1. It was also realized that
agents can greatly improve their performance and global efficiency if they ac-
count for their own impact on the market [4, 10, 11]. In this case the steady
state is a Nash equilibrium, that is a configuration where no agent can improve
his performance by changing his behavior if others stick to theirs. Also in this
case the dynamics is related asymptotically to the minima of a global function,
and hence statistical mechanics again allows one to describe in detail the sta-
tionary state. However, for Nash equilibria replica symmetry breaking (RSB)
occurs. This makes the replica symmetric calculation of Refs [10, 11] only an
approximation.
In this paper we move the first steps towards a complete characterisation of
the set of NE of the minority game. Our analysis will be slightly more general,
for we shall be able to embody the cooperative state as well. First, we shall
briefly outline the replica approach, showing that the replica-symmetric solution
has a limited validity due to entropy arguments. Then we compute the number
of Nash equilibria, following Ref. [13], and show that there are exponentially
many (in N). By analogy with the de Almeida-Thouless stability analysis of
the SK spin glass model [14, 15], we find the phase transition line (AT line)
separating the replica symmetric from the RSB phase. Finally we shall break
the replica symmetry and study the solution in the one-step RSB approximation
(1RSB). Probably the exact solution requires infinitely many steps of RSB, but
1RSB provides already an extremely close agreement with numerical results.
Finally, we will be able to draw complete phase diagram of the model within
1RSB.
Our discussion will focus on the statistical mechanical properties of the
model. The economic and game-theoretic aspects of the model, which are dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere [3, 4, 11, 12], will only be described briefly.
2 The model
2.1 Basic definitions
The essential ingredients of the minority game are:
• N players, labeled by the index i;
1 It should be mentioned at this point that the replica approach fails to describe the
system’s behaviour in a certain range of the parameters, as discussed in Refs [4, 18]. This
point will be made more precise later in the text.
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• for each player i a strategy variable si ∈ {±1}, saying which strategy (+1
or −1) player i is adopting (we restrict ourselves to the case where players
have two strategies each);
• P different information patterns, labeled by the index µ.
At each time step t all players receive the same information µ, drawn at
random with equal probability in {1, . . . , P} [16]. Strategies s are the label of
information processing devices, that suggest an action as a value of a binary
variable (like “buy” or “sell”) upon receiving information µ:
s : {1, . . . , P} ∋ µ 7→ aµi,s ∈ {±1}. (1)
Two such strategies are assigned to each agent and they are drawn at random
and independently for each agent, from the set of all 2P such functions. In
practice, the aµi,s play the role of quenched disorder, analogous to the random
couplings {Jij} in spin glass models.
It is convenient to make the dependence of aµi,s on s explicit by introducing
auxiliary random variables ωµi and ξ
µ
i such that
aµi,s = ω
µ
i + sξ
µ
i . (2)
Clearly, both ξµi and ω
µ
i take on values in {0,±1} but they are not independent.
The payoff to player i under information µ is defined as
uµi (si, s−i) = −aµi,siAµ, Aµ =
∑
j=1,N
aµj,sj (3)
where s−i = {sj}j 6=i. It is positive whenever i is in the minority group, whence
the name of the game. Moreover, players interact with each other only through
a global quantity (namely, Aµ). This feature clarifies the mean-field character
of the model. The total loss experienced by players under information µ simply
reads
−
∑
i=1,N
uµi (si, s−i) = (A
µ)2, (4)
which is always positive.
2.2 Dynamics
A snapshot configuration of the system corresponds to a point {si}Ni=1 in the
(pure) strategy space {±1}N . The game is repeated and at each time step players
face the problem of choosing the strategy to follow. By assumption, each player
keeps a “score” Ui,s(t) for each strategy s = ±1 and updates it as the game
proceeds. In the beginning, players set Ui,±1(0) = 0. Then for t ≥ 0 scores are
updated according to the map
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− 1
P
a
µ(t)
i,s
[
Aµ(t) − η
(
a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
− aµ(t)i,s
)]
(5)
where η ∈ R and si(t) denotes the strategy that player i actually uses at time
t. The term proportional to η is introduced to model agents who account for
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their market impact. We refer the reader to Ref. [11] for a detailed discussion
of this term2.
Let it suffice to say that with η = 0 Eq. (5) reduces to the standard minority
game dynamics: In this case agents reward (penalize) strategies which would
have prescribed a sign opposite (equal) to that of Aµ. In doing so, agents ignore
the fact that if they actually had played those strategies, their contribution
to Aµ, and hence Aµ itself, could have changed. With η = 1 instead, agents
correctly accounting for their contribution to Aµ. Hence the reward to strategy s
is really the payoff that agent i would have received had he played that strategy.
The parameter η tunes the extent to which agents account for their market
impact.
Following [17], we assume that the probability with which player i chooses
the strategy to adopt at time t depends on the strategy’s score as follows:
Prob{si(t) = ±1} = C exp[ΓUi,±1(t)], (6)
where C is a normalization constant and Γ > 0 is the learning rate. With this
rule, the most successful strategy is more likely to be chosen3.
Note that Aµ is the contribution ofN terms whereas the term proportional to
η in Eq. (5) is of order one. One may naively argue that the η term is irrelevant,
as N → ∞. This is not so for exactly the same reason for which the Onsager
reaction term – or cavity field – is relevant in mean-field spin glass theory [14]
4. Indeed Refs. [10, 11] have shown that for η = 1 the dynamics converges to a
NE. This means that, in a sense, players have become fully sophisticated. For
η = 0, instead, agents to converge to a sub-optimal state.
We introduce the continuous variables (“soft spins”) φi(t) ∈ [−1, 1] as
φi = 〈si〉 (7)
where 〈· · · 〉 stands for the average over the distribution of si in the station-
ary state. The system is then described by a point {φi}Ni=1 in the hypercube
[−1, 1]N . Hence the φi’s are the relevant dynamical variables and the phase
space is [−1, 1]N .
The analytic study of the dynamics Eq. (5) has been carried out in Ref. [11].
We shall therefore omit the details and limit ourselves to a brief outline of the
results. One can show that the stationary states of the dynamics correspond to
the minima of the function
Hη =
1,N∑
i6=j
ξµi ξ
µ
j φiφj + 2
N∑
i=1
Ωµξµi φi + η
N∑
i=1
(ξµi )
2(1 − φ2i ) + (Ωµ)2, (8)
2In Refs. [4, 10, 11] the term proportional to η is ηδs,si(t)/P . This leads, however, to the
same results of the last term in Eq. (5), in the statistical mechanics approach. The reason is
that the approach of Refs. [10, 11] is based on the average of the evolution equation in the
stationary state. Observing that a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
a
µ(t)
i,s is 1 when si(t) = s and a random sign, with
zero average, otherwise, we find that the time average of the last term of Eq. (5) is the same
as the average of η(δs,si(t) − 1)/P . Hence the two equations are equivalent (apart from an
irrelevant constant −η/P ).
3For η = 0, our approach gives correct results only for sufficiently large Γ, namely for
Γ > Γc(α) of Ref. [4]
4While the contribution of other spins to the effective field acting on spin i have fluctuating
signs, the contribution of spin i has always the sign of spin i. Mean-field theory needs to be
corrected with the subtraction of the self-interaction from the effective-field, which becomes
a cavity field. Likewise the contribution of agent j 6= i to Aµ is uncorrelated with the action
of agent i, whereas the contribution of agent i itself is totally correlated with his action.
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where · · · = (1/P )∑µ=1,P · · · and Ωµ =∑i=1,N ωµi .
Analyzing the stationary states of the dynamics is then equivalent to mini-
mizing Hη. The limiting cases η = 0 and η = 1 correspond to
H0 = 〈Aµ〉2 and H1 = 〈(Aµ)2〉 (9)
respectively. H0 (whose minima describe the standard minority game) is related
to the market’s predictability or available information, as explained at length
in Refs. [9, 10, 11]. In fact, if 〈Aµ〉 6= 0, then one can predict that the action
aµ = −sign 〈Aµ〉 is more likely to be successful than the other whenever pattern
µ arises. H1 is the long time total loss of players averaged over µ, as is clear
from Eq. (4). In previous works this quantity is usually denoted as σ2. We
stress the fact that the minima of H1 are the game’s NE.
It is easy to understand that [10, 11]:
1. H0 is a positive definite quadratic form. Hence for η = 0 there is a unique
stationary state, corresponding to the cooperative state observed in early
numerical simulations;
2. for any η > 0 both the global efficiency and the individual payoffs are
sensibly improved with respect to the η = 0 case;
3. for η = 1 there is a large number of stationary states, i.e., of NE. These
states have φ2i = 1, i.e., agents play pure strategies.
Point 1. has been treated extensively in previous works. Here we shall focus
on points 2. and 3., namely on the η > 0 case.
3 Replica approach
3.1 Replica-symmetric theory
In order to minimize the function in Eq. (8) we can resort to statistical me-
chanics methods, for
min
{φi}Ni=1∈[−1,+1]
N
Hη = − lim
β→∞
1
β
logZ(β) ≡ lim
β→∞
Fη(β), (10)
where Z(β) is the canonical partition function associated to Hη. Further, since
Hη contains quenched disorder we need to apply the replica formalism [14] to
analyze its ground states. If we let J = {aµi,si} denote collectively the disorder
variables and EJ (· · · ) denote statistical average over J , the “typical free energy”
Fη(β) can be obtained from the identity
EJ [logZ(β)] = lim
n→0
EJ [Z
n(β)]− 1
n
. (11)
A long but standard computation (see appendices in Refs [11, 12]) leads to the
following expression:
Fη(β) =
α
2βn
Tr
{
log
[(
1 +
β
α
)
In +
β
α
qˆ
]}
+
αβ
2n
1,n∑
a 6=b
rabqab +
− 1
βn
log
{
Trs
[
exp
(αβ2
2
1,n∑
a 6=b
rabqab
)]}
+
η
2
(1−Qa). (12)
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where In is the n dimensional unit matrix, qˆ is the overlap matrix with elements
qab = 〈φai φbi 〉 (a, b = 1, . . . , n; a 6= b), and Qa = (1/N)
∑
i=1,N (φ
a
i )
2 (a =
1, . . . , n). The quantities rab and Ra appear as Lagrange multipliers associated
to qab and Qa, respectively.
Imposing the replica-symmetric (RS) Ansatz (qab = q for all a 6= b, Qa = Q
for all a, and similarly for rab and Ra) one obtains
F (RS)η (β) =
α
2
1 + q
α+ β(Q − q) +
α
2β
log
[
1 +
β(Q− q)
α
]
+
β
2
(RQ− rq) +
− 1
β
〈
log
∫ 1
−1
exp[−βV (s; z)]ds
〉
z
+
η
2
(1−Q). (13)
with
V (s; z) = −
√
αr
2
zs− αβ
4
(R − r1)s2. (14)
The ground state properties of Hη in the N → ∞ limit can now be studied by
solving the the saddle point equations (obtained by setting equal to zero the
derivatives of F
(RS)
η (β) with respect to Q, q, R and r) in the β →∞ limit, since
lim
N→∞
min
{φi}Ni=1∈[−1,+1]
N
Hη
N
= lim
β→∞
F
(RS)
η (β)|s.p.
N
, (15)
the subscript s.p. indicating the function F
(RS)
η (β) computed at the saddle point
values of Q, q, R and r. This procedure yields the so-called RS solution.
For η = 0 this solution is characterised by a phase transition at αc ≃
0.3374 . . . separating a symmetric phase (α < αc) with H0 = 0 from an asym-
metric one (α > αc) with H0 > 0. The “spin susceptibility” χ = β(Q − q)/α
diverges as α→ α+c . Also, it is known that this solution is stable against replica
symmetry breaking for all values of the control parameter α. A detailed account
of this case can be found in Ref. [10].
We expect replica symmetry to breakdown for all η > 0 at certain critical
values of α, denoted by αAT (η). In order to test this prediction, we study the
stability of the RS solution for generic η.
We shall see that, in the β →∞ limit a RSB phase arises. It is natural then
to ask whether there is a critical temperature βc separating a high temperature
behavior from a low temperature one. This question, even if not directly related
to the Minority Game, may be of interest in its own and can be answered at the
RS level. Without going into details, let it suffice to mention that setting q = 0
in the RS saddle point equations – which is correct for the high temperature
phase – one finds βc = 0 for all values of α and η.
3.2 Entropy of the RS solution for η = 1
In random Ising spin systems useful indications about the stability of the RS
solution are provided by the zero temperature entropy, namely
S(RS)η (β →∞) = lim
β→∞
β2
∂F
(RS)
η (β)
∂β2
. (16)
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This quantity is non-negative due to the discreteness of the configuration space
of the model (i.e., {±1}N). If its zero temperature limit turns out to be negative,
the corresponding solution is unstable and further steps in the approximation
are needed.
In our case, this point is more subtle than it seems. In fact, Hη is defined for
continuous variables φi ∈ [−1,+1], and not for Ising (i.e., discrete) variables.
The corresponding configuration space is not a discrete set of points, but rather
a continuum. Therefore, in principle, the zero temperature entropy need not be
non-negative.
For η = 1, however, Hη attains its minima on the corners of the phase space
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[−1, 1]N , i.e., φi = ±1 for all i. Hence the zero temperature entropy calculation
is revealing. Leaving details of the computation aside, the final result is that
for α > 1/π
S
(RS)
1 (β →∞) =
α
2
[ C
α+ C
− log
(
1 +
C
α
)]
, C =
α√
πα− 1 . (17)
This is negative for all α > 1/π and it diverges at α = 1/π. For α < 1/π one
finds S1 = −∞. This means that RSB occurs for all values of α at η = 1, or, in
other words, that the study of NE requires RSB.
3.3 The number of Nash equilibria
A crucial feature of the occurrence of replica symmetry breaking is gained from
the study of the number of minima of H1. We show here that an exponentially
(in N) large number of such minima occurs, i.e., that the game possesses an
exponentially large number of NE. Our analytic results will be supported by
numerical investigations.
In order to compute the number of Nash equilibria (NE) we use the fact that
NE are in pure strategies5, or, that at any NE φi = ±1 for all i. Keeping this
in mind, we start by considering that NE satisfy the condition
φi
[
uµi (+1, s−i)− uµi (−1, s−i)
]
= 2
[
(ξµi )
2 −Aµξµi φi
]
≥ 0, ∀i. (18)
Hence an indicator function for NE (using 2(ξµi )
2 ≃ 1) is
INE({φi}) =
N∏
i=1
θ
(
1− 2Aµξµi φi
)
(19)
(INE = 1 if {φi} is a NE and = 0 otherwise) and the number of NE is just
obtained summing over all configuration {φi} ∈ {±1}N (an operation which we
denote by Trφ). Hence NNE = TrφINE{φi}. Following [13] we take the average
over the disorder and introduce the integral representation of the θ function.
We arrive at6
EJ (NNE) = N
2α3
(2π)2
∫ ∞
−∞
dγ dΓ dω dΩexp [NΣ(γ,Γ, ω,Ω)] (20)
5This is a consequence of the fact that H1 is an harmonic function of φi, i.e. ∇
2
φ
H1 = 0.
This implies that extrema occurs on the corners.
6 The reader is warned that the Ω appearing here is in no relation with the Ωµ introduced
in Section 2.
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with
Σ(α, γ,Γ, ω,Ω) = αωγ + α2ΩΓ− α
2
log
[
(1 + γ)2 + 2Γ
]
+ log
[
1 + erf
(
1− ω
2
√
Ω
)]
(21)
Eq. (20) is dominated by the saddle point of φ, which is attained at ω = 1− γ,
Ω = 1−γ
α(1+γ) and Γ =
γ2(1+γ)
2(1−γ) , where γ is the root of the equation
γ2
4
α(1 + γ)
1− γ = log
(
γ
√
α(1 + γ)
1− γ
)
− log
{
αγ2
[
1 + erf
(
γ
2
√
α(1 + γ)
1− γ
)]}
.
(22)
In terms of the solution γ∗ of this equation we have
Σ(α) =
αγ∗
2
(2 − γ∗)− α
2
log
(
1 + γ∗
1− γ∗
)
+ log
[
1 + erf
(
γ∗
2
√
α(1 + γ∗)
1− γ∗
)]
.
(23)
The behavior of Σ as a function of α is shown in Fig. 1. As expected (see
[4]), as α → 0 the number of NE grows as 2N . Numerical results from exact
enumeration for N ≤ 20 are in very good agreement, which shows that the
so-called annealed approximation used here (i.e., taking the average of NNE) is
sufficient and one does not need to introduce replicas (to compute the average
of logNNE) at this level.
3.4 de Almeida-Thouless line
A more thorough analysis can be obtained using the de Almeida-Thouless (AT)
protocol [15]. In order to investigate the stability of the RS ground states of
Hη against RSB we compute the matrix of the second derivatives of the general
expression for the free energy, Eq. (12), with respect to qab and rab. The
conditions for RSB are then obtained by studying the effect of fluctuations in
the direction of RSB. This analysis results in an instability line – i.e. a family of
points where the RS solution becomes unstable – in the parameter space (α, η),
called the AT line and denoted by αAT (η). The resulting equation has to be
solved (numerically) together with the RS saddle point equations.
An outline of the calculation is reported in the appendix. We have studied
particularly the so called replicon mode, namely those eigenvectors of the stabil-
ity matrix which are symmetric under interchange of all but two of the indices.
The replicon mode is typically responsible for the onset of the RSB instability.
Points on the AT line are found to satisfy the following stability condition:
α
[
1− η
(
1 +
β(Q − q)
α
)]2
= 1. (24)
The “susceptibility” χ ≡ β(Q − q)/α remains finite as β → ∞, so that the
zero temperature behaviour can be safely detected. Results are reported in Fig.
2. For η = 0 replica symmetry is preserved for all α. The point αc = 0.3374 . . .
where the second order phase transition occurs in the standard MG, separates
a line of first order phase transitions, for α < αc, from a second order line. For
η = 0+ one finds RSB for αAT = 1
+. Finally, for η = 1, RS is broken for all α.
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3.5 Replica symmetry breaking
The one step breaking of replica permutation symmetry is expressed by the
Parisi Ansatz for the qab’s and the Qa’s, where an additional parameter denoted
by m is introduced: Qa = Q (all a), qab = q1 (all a 6= b such that |a− b| ≤ m)
and qab = q0 (otherwise). The “free energy” is the same as in Eq. (12), but this
time the overlap matrix has to be parameterised as
qˆ = q0ǫnǫ
T
n + (q1 − q0)I nm ⊗ ǫmǫTm + (Q− q1)In, (25)
where ǫn is the n-dimensional column vector with all components equal to one
(so that ǫnǫ
T
n is the n dimensional matrix with all elements equal to one) and
we have used the standard tensor product.
We need to consider the matrix
Tˆ =
(
1 +
β
α
)
In +
β
α
qˆ, (26)
that is
Tˆ =
[
1 +
β
α
(Q− q1)
]
In +
β
α
(1 + q0)ǫnǫ
T
n +
β
α
(q1 − q0)I n
m
⊗ ǫmǫTm. (27)
Using the identities
In ≡ I n
m
⊗ Im
ǫnǫ
T
n ≡ ǫ nm ǫTnm ⊗ ǫmǫ
T
m (28)
we can decompose Tˆ into tensor products and write its determinant |Tˆ | in a
straightforward way (we need |Tˆ | because Tr(log Tˆ ) = log |Tˆ |). We get
|Tˆ | =
[
1 +
β
α
(Q − q1) + nβ
α
(1 + q0) +m
β
α
(q1 − q0)
]
×
×
[
1 +
β
α
(Q− q1) +mβ
α
(q1 − q0)
] n
m
−1[
1 +
β
α
(Q− q1)
]n− n
m
.
This means that the first factor on the r.h.s. is an eigenvalue of Tˆ with mul-
tiplicity one, the second one is an eigenvalue with multiplicity n
m
− 1, and the
third one is an eigenvalue with multiplicity n− n
m
.
Putting the latter formula into Eq. (12) and taking the n → 0 limit as
requested by the replica trick, we obtain the one step replica symmetry broken
free energy F
(1RSB)
η (β), whose final expression is
F (1RSB)η (β) =
α
2
1 + q0
α+ β(Q − q1) +mβ(q1 − q0) +
η
2
(1−Q) +
+
α
2β
log
[
1 +
mβ(q1 − q0)
α+ β(Q − q1)
]
+
+
α
2βm
log
[
1 +
mβ(q1 − q0)
α+ β(Q − q1)
]
+ (29)
+
αβ
4
[RQ+ (m− 1)r1q1 −mr0q0] +
− 1
mβ
〈
log
〈( ∫ 1
−1
ds exp[−βV (s; y, z)]
)m〉
y
〉
z
,
9
where 〈· · · 〉x denotes again the average over the unit gaussian variables x and
V (s; y, z) = −
√
αr0
2
zs−
√
α(r1 − r0)
2
ys− αβ
4
(R − r1)s2. (30)
F
(1RSB)
η (β) depends on seven parameters: the three overlap matrix elements
Q, q0, q1, their related Lagrange multipliers R, r0 and r1, and m. Their values
have to be determined self-consistently from the seven saddle point equations
obtained by setting to zero the derivatives of the free energy with respect to the
above parameters. These equations can be solved numerically.
One finds three different regimes in the (α, η) plane when β → ∞ (Figure
2):
1. For α < α0 ≃ 0.09012 . . . (all η > 0) one has Hη = 0. The solution does
not depend on η as long as η > 0. The self-overlap is Q = 1 signalling that
agents play pure strategies (φi = ±1) but off diagonal overlaps q1 > q0
are both less than 1. This suggests that NE are organized in a complex
geometric structure. The parameter m attains a finite value.
2. For α0 < α < α1(η) (all η > 0) the solution has Hη > 0, it is independent
of η (for η > 0) and 1 = Q = q1 > q0. The spin susceptibility χ =
β(Q − q1)/α attains a finite value in the limit β → ∞, which diverges
as α → α0. Again agents play pure strategies and q0 < 1 is the typical
overlap between two NE. The parameter m vanishes as 1/β (indeed the
βm is finite as β →∞). The line α1(η) is determined by the solution of
η
2
=
1
α+ β(Q− q1) . (31)
3. In between the line α1(η) and the stability line αAT(η) the solution has
Hη > 0 and 1 > Q = q1 > q0. Hence agents do not play pure strategies.
The solution in this region depends on η.
We stress again that NE are in pure strategies, since at η = 1 for all values
of α one finds Q = 1.
Figure 3 shows that the one-step calculation for H1/N agrees very well with
numerical simulations and it represents a considerable improvement over the
replica symmetric result7 Further steps of RSB, most probably infinitely many,
are likely to be needed to recover exact results. However, already the one step
calculation provides a rather good approximation.
4 Conclusion
Summarizing, we have analyzed the solution of the minority game by means of
statistical mechanics methods. Our starting point has been the study of Refs
[10, 11], where the NE of the game have been mapped onto the ground states
of a disordered hamiltonian with RSB, suggesting the existence of a very large
number of them. First, we have computed (both analitically and numerically)
7Note that numerical results refer to a typical NE which need not be the ground state of
H1.
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the number of NE, showing that actually they are exponentially many in N
(number of players). Then, we probed the stability of the replica symmetric
theory developed in Ref. [10]. After showing the necessity of RSB by simple
entropy considerations, we have calculated the instability line (AT line) using
the de Almeida-Thouless method. Finally, we have derived the broken-replica-
symmetry solution, drawing the complete phase diagram of the model. All our
results are in excellent agreement with computer experiments.
To our knowledge, the minority game is the first example of a market game
that requires the full use of spin glass theory in order to uncover its behaviour.
Remarkably, many features actually observed in real markets can be recovered
within the simple setup of the minority game [3, 4, 5]. Understanding real
markets is among the most challenging theoretical problems ahead of us. This
work suggests that statistical mechanics of disordered systems may be a valuable
tool in this endeavour.
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A Calculation of the AT line
The stability matrix has dimension n(n− 1)× n(n− 1) and is given by
C =
(
A(ab,cd) D(ab,cd)
D(ab,cd) B(ab,cd)
)
(32)
where
A(ab,cd) =
∂2(nF )
∂qab∂qcd
, B(ab,cd) =
∂2(nF )
∂rab∂rcd
and D(ab,cd) =
∂2(nF )
∂qab∂rcd
(33)
(F denotes shortly the replica-symmetric free energy.)
Introducing the “perturbation” of the RS solution in the form
δqab = ζab and δrab = xζab (34)
with the condition
∑
b ζab = 0 for all a, it is possible to show that this condition
is satisfied for all n by
ζab = ζ (a, b) 6= (1, 2)
ζ1b = ζ2b =
1
2
(3− n)ζ b 6= 1, 2
ζ12 =
1
2
(2− n)(3− n)ζ (a, b) = (1, 2) (35)
ζaa = 0 ∀a.
The relevant eigenvalue equations (the so-called replicon mode) are given by∑
cd
(
A(ab,cd) + xD(ab,cd)
)
ζcd = λζab
∑
cd
(
xA(ab,cd) +D(ab,cd)
)
ζcd = λxζab (36)
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One needs to find an expression for the matrix elemnts A, B and D.
There are three different types of matrix elements in the replica symmetric
state, corresponding to the cases (a, b) = (c, d), a = c and (a, b) 6= (c, d) respec-
tively. For the A(ab,cd) they are A(ab,ab), A(ab,ad) and A(ab,cd). It is simple to
show that in the replica symmetric state
A(ab,ab) = −αβ(Eab2 + E2aa)
A(ab,ad) = −αβ[Eab(Eab + Eaa)]
A(ab,cd) = −2αβE2ab (37)
where
Eab = βq[α+ β(Q − q)]−2 and Eaa = Eab + [α+ β(Q − q)]−1. (38)
For the B(ab,cd) we find
B(ab,ab) = −α2β3(〈〈s2〉2〉z − 〈〈s〉2〉2z)
B(ab,ad) = −α2β3(〈〈s2〉〈s〉2〉z − 〈〈s〉2〉2z) (39)
B(ab,cd) = −α2β3(〈〈s〉4〉z − 〈〈s〉2〉2z)
As for D(ab,cd), one finds the general result
D(ab,cd) = αβ
(
δacδbd + δadδbc
)
. (40)
It is important to notice that the relevant combinations of matrix elements
appearing in the eigenvalue equations are of the form A(ab,cd) − 2A(ab,ad) +
A(ab,cd), and that the eigenvalues can be shown to depend only on
a = A(ab,cd) − 2A(ab,ad) +A(ab,cd) and b = B(ab,cd) − 2B(ab,ad) +B(ab,cd)
(41)
via the simple formula
λ± =
1
2
(
a+ b±
√
(a− b)2 + 4
)
. (42)
Putting things together and solving the eigenvalue equations, one finds that
one of the eigenvalue (namely λ−) is constant in sign (at least at low temper-
atures). The second one, instead, changes sign and signals the onset of RSB
instability. The equation corresponding to λ+ = 0 in the end reads
αβ2
α2[1 + β(Q − q)/α]2 〈(〈s
2〉 − 〈s〉2)2〉z = 1. (43)
Calculating explicitly the averages appearing in the above formula one arrives
at the AT line reported in the text:
α[1− η(1 + β(Q− q)/α)]2 = 1. (44)
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the Minority Game, where the shaded region
corrsponds to the replica-symmetric phase and the light region to the RSB
phase. The AT line marking the boundary between the RS and RSB phases is
denoted by αAT(η). The point αc ≃ 0.3374 . . . separates a line of second order
transitions (full heavy line for α > αc) from a first order line of critical points
(heavy dashed line for α < αc). Light dashed lines refer to the different regimes
found in the solution of the one-step approximation in the RSB phase (see text
for details).
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Figure 3: Behaviour of σ2/N ≡ H1/N , corresponding to NE. The one-step
solution is compared to numerical data and to the RS solution (dashed line).
16
